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 Culture‘s psychological impact stretches from some of the most basic perceptual 
processes to higher order reasoning. Yet much less is known about the impact of group 
differences within cultures due to factors such as social class, geographic region, or 
religion. Exploring within-culture differences not only provides insight into the 
psychological consequences of these factors, but can also inform our understanding of the 
mechanisms by which cultural differences operate and are maintained. 
 In Chapter 2, I explore the effects of culture and social class on cognitive habits 
(attribution, patterns of visual attention, and reasoning about change) and symbolic 
representation of the self. Russians demonstrated more holistic cognitive patterns and less 
symbolic self-inflation than Americans; people from working-class backgrounds 
demonstrated more holistic cognitive patterns and less symbolic self-inflation than those 
from middle-class backgrounds. Furthermore, for both group comparisons, cognitive 
differences were partially mediated by differences in self-inflation, suggesting a common 
mechanism may underlie both group differences. 
 In Chapter 3, I examined whether social class differences in causal inference 
might be due to relatively automatic or controlled processes. Previous research has found 
that cultural differences in causal inference appear to be due to differences in early-stage 
processing of personality-relevant information. Using an ERP paradigm, we found results 
for social class that were largely parallel to the previously observed cross-cultural 
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difference, suggesting that differences in attribution related to culture and to social class 
both likely arise from automatic inference processes.  
 In Chapter 4, I tested the voluntary settlement hypothesis by exploring regional 
variation in naming practices both within  the US and Canada and comparing countries 
recently settled by Europeans with European countries. The voluntary settlement 
hypothesis (Kitayama, et al., 2010) holds that areas that were more recently frontiers both 
select for individuals who are more independent and promote independent values and 
behaviors. I found that popular names were less prevalent in US states and Canadian 
provinces that were more recently frontiers. The same pattern was observed comparing 
countries recently settled by Europeans with European countries, suggesting that the 
















 Over the past 20 years social psychologists have found a renewed interest in 
culture. Cross-cultural comparisons have revealed that cultures differ in a host of domains 
including, emotional experiences (Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006; Tsai, 2007), 
emotional inference (Masuda, Ellsworth, Mesquita, Leu, Tanida, & Van de Veerdonk, 
2008), well-being (Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1994), rumination (Grossmann & Kross, 
2011), conformity (Bond & Smith, 1996), perspective taking (Cohen, Hoshino-Browne, 
& Leung, 2007), and social support seeking (Kim, Sherman, & Taylor, 2008). In fact 
some of the most well studied social psychological phenomena have been found to be 
influenced by culture. For example, while both Westerners and East Asians experience 
cognitive dissonance, they do so in response to different types of choices and in different 
contexts. Westerners experience cognitive dissonance when making choices for the self, 
but not for close others, whereas East Asians show the opposite pattern (Hoshino-
Browne, Zanna, Zanna, & Kitayama, 2005). Additionally, Westerners display dissonance 
when making choices in private, but not when the presence of social others is primed, 
here again East Asians show the opposite pattern (Imada & Kitayama, 2010).   
Even the Fundamental Attribution Error, does not seem to be universal. Several 
studies have shown that East Asians are less prone to dispositional bias than Americans 
(Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 2006; Masuda 
& Kitayama, 2004). Grossmann and Varnum (2011) recently found parallel differences 
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when comparing Russians and Americans. Given these findings that even classic social 
psychological phenomena are culturally influenced (and in some cases culturally bound) 
psychologists must take into account the potential role of culture or run the risk of 
creating ethnographies rather than broader accounts of human thought and behavior. 
Although cultural psychology has explored the effect of culture on a variety of 
psychological processes, two of the most studied and arguably most important areas have 
been how the self is viewed and cognitive habits. 
Social Orientation 
 Cultures differ in how they view the self, with independent social orientation 
being more prevalent in some societies (such as the US, Canada, and the UK), and 
interdependent social orientation being more prevalent in others (such as Japan, China, 
and Russia).  Generally speaking, cultures can be thought of as placing greater emphasis 
on the individual or on relationships (see Table 1.1). According to Varnum and colleagues 
(2010): 
Cultures that endorse and afford independent social orientation tend to emphasize 
self-direction, autonomy, and self-expression. Cultures that endorse and afford 
interdependent social orientation tend to emphasize harmony, relatedness, and 
connection. Independently oriented cultures tend to view the self as bounded and separate 
from social others, whereas interdependently oriented cultures tend to view the self as 
interconnected and as encompassing important relationships (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Triandis, 1989). In independently oriented cultural contexts, happiness is most 
often experienced as a socially disengaging emotion (i.e., pride), whereas in 
interdependently oriented cultural contexts, happiness is most often experienced as a 
socially engaging emotion (i.e., sense of closeness to others; Kitayama, Mesquita, & 
Karasawa, 2006). Finally, in cultures that have an independent social orientation, people 
are more motivated to symbolically enhance the self at the expense of others; this 
tendency is not as common in interdependently oriented cultures (Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, 
Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 2006; Kitayama, Mesquita, et al., 2006). 
 
What unites different aspects of an independent social orientation is a focus on the 
self as autonomous, and a desire to express uniqueness and personal agency. In contrast, 
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interdependent social orientation is characterized by a strong emphasis on close 
relationships and a desire to promote and affirm these ties. 
Analytic vs. Holistic Cognitive Habits 
Another major dimension of cultural difference, is the tendency to think 
analytically or holistically (see Table 1.2). Western societies tend to be characterized by 
more analytic cognitive patterns, while East Asian and Eastern European societies tend to 
be characterized by more holistic cognitive patterns. According to Varnum and colleagues 
(2010): 
Analytic cognition is characterized by taxonomic and rule-based categorization of 
objects, a narrow focus in visual attention, dispositional bias in causal attribution, and the 
use of formal logic in reasoning. In contrast, holistic cognition is characterized by 
thematic and family-resemblance based categorization of objects, a focus on contextual 
information and relationships in visual attention, an emphasis on situational causes in 
attribution, and dialecticism (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). What unites the 
elements of the analytic style is a tendency to focus on a single dimension or aspect—
whether in categorizing objects or evaluating arguments—and a tendency to disentangle 
phenomena from the contexts in which they are embedded—for example, focusing on the 
individual as a causal agent or attending to focal objects in visual scenes. What unites the 
elements of the holistic style is a broad attention to context and relationships in visual 
attention, categorizing objects, and explaining social behavior. 
 
These different cognitive habits are evident not only in reasoning about the social world, 
for example in inferring whether internal traits or contextual factors caused another 
person‘s behavior (i.e. Kitayama et al., 2006), but also in non-social cognition such as the 
ability to replicate the exact length of a line or the proportion of a line to a frame 
(Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). 
The Social Orientation Hypothesis 
 
 Theorists since at least the time of Tönnies (1887/2002) have suggested that the 
way we view the self has consequences for other types of reasoning. Further, cultural 
differences in the self have been proposed as an explanation for differences in a variety of 
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cognitive habits, including narrow vs. contextual visual attention, situational vs. 
dispositional inferences about the cause of others' behavior, different lay theories of 





 person perspectives when recalling events, and analytic vs. 
dialectical reasoning about contradiction, to name a few (see Markus & Kitayama, 1991;  
Nisbett, 2003; Norenzayan et al., 2007).   
Two major lines of research have provided evidence in support of the social 
orientation hypothesis. First, social orientation and cognitive habits tend to co-vary, such 
that if Group A is more independent than Group B, Group A is also more analytic (for a 
review see Varnum et al., 2010).  Second, priming different social orientations leads to 
corresponding shifts in cognition; those primed with independence demonstrate more 
analytic cognitive patterns, whereas those primed with interdependence show more 
holistic cognition. A recent meta-analysis found these effects across a  variety of different 
primes and dependent variables, and for both European-American and Asian-American 
participants (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). 
Models of Between- and Within- Culture Differences 
In this view, contemporary psychological differences between cultural groups 
arose due to a combination of distal factors including environmental conditions, self-
selection, population density, and social and economic organization (see Figure 1; see 
also Nisbett, 2003). These differences are maintained through institutions and social 
norms (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Gelfand et al., in press) and are passed on through 
socialization practices (Bornstein et al., 1990; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). More 
proximally, the types of situations that are common in different cultural mileus and the 
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affordances and constraints they provide (Kitayama, Markus, Matusmoto, & 
Norasakkunkit, 1997) in addition to chronic priming of different types of social 
orientation (Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, & Chen, 2009)  
maintain cultural differences in social orientation and cognitive habits, and may lead to 
functional neural differences (for a review see also Kitayama & Uskul, 2010). 
More recently, evidence has emerged to suggest that the distribution of genotypes 
related to neurotransmitters like serotonin, specifically 5HTTLPR may also play a role in 
the origin and maintenance of cultural differences in social orientation (Chiao & 
Blizinsky, 2010). Specifically, national S-allele prevalence was associated with higher 
levels of country-level collectivism. Other work has suggested that polymorphisms of 
5HTR1A (another gene linked to serotonin reception) may act differently in American 
and Korean populations, such that those with the homozygous G genotype (which is 
related to decreased response to changes in reinforcement) report more culturally typical 
patterns of cognition (analytic vs. holistic) compared with those who are carriers for the 
C genotype (Kim et al., 2010). The emerging field of cultural neuroscience has also 
shown that functional neural differences are associated with differences in independence 
vs. interdependence (e.g., Chiao et al., 2009; 2010; Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & Han, 2007). In 
the present model, these neural differences are viewed as likely influenced by genes and 
socialization (see Figure 1.1). 
This model may or may not provide a good description of how within-culture 
differences are created and maintained. In the case of regional variation, this model may 
provide a plausible description of the creation and maintenance of differences in 
psychological tendencies. In the case of social class differences and differences between 
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age cohorts this model may not be as useful. In the case of social class, it less likely that 
there are differences in genotype between groups and differences in the conditions of 
work environments likely play a larger role than they do in the case of cultural 
differences.  In the case of differences between religious communities, the tenants of 
belief and the practices of religious observance are likely to be key. For example, 
compared to Catholics, Protestants tend to be less relationally attuned in work settings, 
which likely reflects the Protestant Work Ethic (Sanchez-Burks, 2002). Religious 
ideology has also been shown to influence patterns of visual attention (Clozato, et al., 
2010) with Calvinists (whose religious ideology emphasizes the individual) showing 
more global patterns of attention than Jews and Catholics (whose religious ideology is 
more focused on the community). Cohen and colleagues (2011) report similar findings, 
with Protestants showing greater dispositional bias than Atheists, a finding that was 
mediated by belief in the soul. Finally, in the case of age cohorts, cohort specific events 
(such as the Great Depression and Second World War), changes in residential and 
occupational mobility, and perhaps the aging process itself are likely to be more relevant 
than more distal factors or genetic variation.  
Limitations of Cross-Cultural Approaches 
 
The current literature documenting cross-cultural differences has provided a 
strong challenge to universalist accounts of human psychology and has caused social and 
cognitive psychologists to begin to take culture into account. While studies comparing 
cultures within these regions have shed a great deal of light on how culture influences the 
way we think from the emotions we experience to what parts of the physical world we 
attend to it, this line of research has not been without limitations. One major limitation of 
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the cross-cultural approach has been that is has primarily compared two cultural regions, 
North American and East Asia which differ in a number of important variables.  For 
example North American and East Asian societies differ in terms of, 1) political systems 
(and the length of time in which democratic institutions have been in place), 2) economic 
systems and policies, 3) ethnic homogeneity, 4) religion and religiousity, 5) philosophical 
systems which have been culturally influential, 6) population density, 7) languages and 
linguistic structure, 8) the prevalence of different dopaminergic and serotonergic 
genotypes. This list is by no means exhaustive, yet given these differences it is difficult to 
isolate the key ingredient that may lead to say, the difference between Americans and 
Chinese in patterns of visual attention.  
Similarly, this approach limits the ability of researchers to isolate causal 
relationships among variables of interest (such as social orientation and analytic vs. 
holistic cognitive habits), which tend to co-vary when comparing North Americans and 
East Asians. The fact that views of the self and cognitive habits tend to co-vary when 
comparing other cultural groups provides stronger evidence for the social orientation 
hypothesis, however it is the fact that this covariation occurs when comparing groups 
make the hypothesis far more plausible (Varnum et al., 2010). 
The approach of comparing North American and East Asian societies is also 
limiting, in that there are cultural differences in psychological processes which are not 
captured by this comparison, including differences in color perception (Roberson, Davies, 
& Davidoff, 2000), susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion (Segall, Campbell, & 
Herskovitz, 1966), fairness and cooperation (Henrich et al., 2006; 2010), and punishment 
(Henrich et al., 2006; 2010; Marlowe, et al., 2008), to name a just few. On these 
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dimensions the more, it is more revealing to contrast small and large scale societies 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Similarly, differences in aggressive response to 
insults, also known as ―Culture of Honor,‖ tends to differ among Northerners and 
Southerners in the US (Cohen et al., 1996) and likely also varies when comparing 
cultures that are less mobile and where institutions are more developed and law 
enforcement reliable with cultures where this is not the case (such as nomadic and 
herding societies). These findings suggest that focusing solely on these two cultural 
regions (North American and East Asia) may lead psychologists to overlook how culture 
affects a number of psychological processes. 
Finally, another major limitation of the cross-cultural approach, and specifically 
the body of work comparing North Americans and East Asians, is that it assumes greater 
psychological homogeneity within cultures than may actually be present. Typically, 
cross-cultural studies have neither statistically controlled for, nor systematically designed 
research that explores the role of within-culture variables such as social class, age, 
religious affiliation, or region on the variables of interest. 
Within-Culture Approaches 
 
 Given the limitations of cross-cultural approaches, cultural psychologists have 
begun to explore the impact of within-culture variables. There are several advantages to 
utilizing within-culture designs and designs that combine both within and between 
cultural comparisons, but I will focus on four. 1) Such studies provide insight into the 
impact of major social and demographic variables which have been understudied, e.g. 
social class, on psychological tendencies such as social orientation and cognitive habits, 
2) these designs allow the researcher to better rule out third variables in exploring the 
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relationship among psychological tendencies that co-vary across cultural groups, 3) such 
approaches allow one to test whether the same within-culture variables have similar 
effects in different societies (or whether their effects are opposite, or confined to a single 
culture), 4) such approaches can allow for a test of the generalizability of previous cross-
cultural findings within the broader populations of the societies in which these 
differences have been documented (for example, it may be that US-China differences in 
visual attention are confined to participants from middle-class backgrounds, or they may 
be present regardless of social class). 
 Recently cultural psychologists have begun to explore some of these within-
culture differences, yielding several interesting findings. For example, Krauss and 
colleagues (2009) have shown that people from working-class backgrounds are less prone 
to the fundamental attribution error than those from middle-class backgrounds. In 
addition working-class people are quicker to engage in social mimicry (Krauss, Côte, & 
Keltner, 2010) suggesting that they are more socially attuned than middle-class 
participants. Working-class people show less preference for uniqueness when making 
choices (Stephens, et al., 2007) and show less cognitive dissonance when making choices 
for the self (Snibbe & Markus, 2005).  
Another line of research has explored how the differences in the basis of local 
economic activity (hunting vs. cooperative fishing and farming) in neighboring Turkish 
villages has consequences for people‘s cognitive habits (Uskul. Kitayama, & Nisbett, 
2008). Hunters, tend think more analytically than fisherman and farmers, categorizing 
objects more taxonomically, and showing more narrow patterns of visual attention (Uskul 
et al., 2008).  Knight and Nisbett (2007) have also shown within-culture differences in 
 
 10 
categorization, finding that Northern Italians categorize objects more taxonomically than 
Southern Italians. These studies and others suggest that within-culture factors like social 
class and whether economic activity is independent or  cooperative may have similar 
effects to culture in terms of social orientation and analytic vs. holistic cognition. Taken 
together such studies also suggest that social orientation and cognitive habits tend to co-
vary even when comparing groups that are similar in terms of language, genotype, and 
other factors which differ cross-culturally (for a review see Varnum, Grossmann, 
Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2010). 
Overview of the Present Work 
 Below, I will outline my attempt to explore how between- and within- culture 
differences have an impact on views of the self (and the behavioral consequences of those 
views) and on cognitive habits.  I am using the format of a three-paper dissertation, in 
which each chapter consists of an article which has been published or is being prepared 
for publication. 
The three papers that make up this dissertation all examine some aspect of social 
orientation, analytic vs. holistic cognition, or both. All three chapters focus on the 
psychological consequences of a within-culture variable. Chapters 1 and 2 examine social 
class; Chapter 3 explores regional variation in settlement history. The studies reported in 
chapters 1 and 3 also employ a mixture of within- and between-culture designs.  
The goals of the present line of research are to 1) determine whether the within-
culture factors being studied have an impact on social orientation and cognitive habits, 
and 2) to determine what the relationship is between these within-culture factors and 
between-culture differences in these domains and whether they operate through similar 
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mechanisms. The studies presented in Chapter 2 sought to assess whether a social class 
had a similar effect in an independent society and an interdependent society; they also 
sought to test whether the same mechanism might account for both within- and between- 
culture differences. The study presented in Chapter 3 sought to test whether social class 
differences in attribution were due differences in automatic inferences using an ERP 
paradigm. The studies presented in Chapter 4 explored whether differences in settlement 
history could account for both within- and between- culture differences in a behavioral 
expression of social orientation tendencies.  
Chapter 2, which is a paper co-authored with Igor Grossmann presents two 
studies which explore the effect of social class and culture (American vs. Russian) on 
attribution, patterns of visual attention, and reasoning about change.  Previous research 
has suggested that Russians are more interdependent than Americans (Matsumoto, et al., 
1999), and that they have more contextual patterns of visual attention (Kühnen, et al., 
2001). There is also some reason to believe that working-class people are more 
interdependent than middle-class people (Kraus, Côte, & Keltner, 2010; Na et al., 2010; 
Snibbe & Markus, 2005; Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007) and more holistic 
(Krauss, Piff, & Keltner, 2009). The present paper extends those findings by using 
multiple dependent variables, and by simultaneously examining the effects of culture and 
class. 
 The first study attempted to replicate Kraus‘ (2009) finding that working-class 
people have more situational attribution tendencies, and extends that work by testing 
whether this relationship is true in both the US and Russia. The second study examined 
the effect of social class and culture on visual attention, reasoning about change and 
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symbolic self-inflation. In this study we also tested the social orientation hypothesis 
(Kitayama & Markus, 1991; Nisbett et al., 2001), which holds that group differences in 
analytic vs. holistic cognition are the result of group differences in independent vs. 
interdependent views of the self. In this study we explored the role of symbolic self-
inflation as a mediator for both the cultural and social class effects which are observed.  
In Chapter 3, a paper co-authored with Jinkyung Na and Shinobu Kitayama, we 
explored whether social class differences were present in spontaneous trait inference 
using Event Related Potentials (ERPs). A major goal of this study was to determine 
whether previously documented social class differences in attribution (Grossmann & 
Varnum, 2011; Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009) might be due to differences in automatic 
processes. Recently, evidence has emerged to suggest that differences in attribution 
between European-Americans and Asians (and Asian-Americans) are likely due to 
differences in automatic inference processes rather than a later-stage motivated attempt to 
correct for initial dispositional bias (Na & Kitayama, in press). In this study we sought to 
address whether social class differences in attribution might also be due to automatic as 
opposed to controlled processes. This study also provides some insight into the ―depth‖ 
of social class based differences in holistic vs. analytic cognitive habits.  
Chapter 4, which is a paper co-authored with Shinobu Kitayama, examines the 
legacy of frontier settlement for contemporary regional differences. Previous research has 
found that residents of Hokkaido, which was more recently settled by ethnic Japanese 
than the other Japanese islands, are more independent than residents of the rest of Japan 
(Kitayama et al., 2006). These differences have been interpreted as supporting the 
voluntary settlement hypothesis (Kitayama et al., 2010), which holds that areas that were 
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more recently frontiers both select for and continue to reward and perpetuate more 
independent values, such as uniqueness and self-reliance. Recent evidence (Park et al., 
2009) suggests that similar differences in values exist between the more recently settled 
parts of the US and regions with a longer history of settlement (such as New England).  
In this paper, we explored the effect of voluntary settlement history on a 
behavioral measure of independent values – the choice of a relatively popular or unique 
name for one‘s children. Studies 1 and 2 explored this relationship by comparing states 
the US that were more recently settled with older states, and making a similar comparison 
of Canadian provinces. Study 3, looks at the effect of settlement history on naming cross-
nationally, comparing countries that were more recently frontiers (such as the US and 
Australia) with European countries. In Study 3, we also explored whether country-level 
independence, as measured by Hofstede and colleagues‘ (2010) Individualism index, was 
correlated with naming practices. 
Finally, Chapter 5 provides a summary of main findings of Chapters 2, 3, and 4, 
and attempts to integrate them. I then discuss some of the implications of this research for 
cultural psychology and psychology in general. I also explore some of the more practical 
implications of these findings for educational settings, advertising, and public service 
appeals. The chapter concludes with a discussion of future research directions that build 







Table 1.1. Components of Social Orientation, adapted from Varnum et al., 2010 
 

















Personal social identity 
Self as bounded 





Relational social identity 
Self as overlapping with close 
others 
Personality varies across 
situations 
   
Emotions Higher propensity of socially 
disengaging emotions 
Happiness as a disengaging 
emotion 
 
Higher propensity of socially 
engaging emotions 
Happiness as an engaging 
emotion 
 
Motivation Individual Achievement 
Self-enhancement 
Ego-inflation 


















Table 1.2. Components of Analytic vs. Holistic Cognition, adapted from Varnum et al., 
2010 
 






Focus on salient objects with 









Taxonomic, focus on a single 
dimension or shared property 
 
Thematic, focus on functional 
relationship or overall similarity 
Attribution Dispositional 




External forces, context, & 
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Chapter 2:  
 
Social Class, Culture, and Cognition 
 
 Social class has been present in nearly every society and has been a central topic 
in the social sciences for centuries (e.g., Durkheim, 1893/1933; Marx, 1956). It has been 
associated with a broad range of consequences, including differences in aesthetic 
preferences (Bourdieu, 1984; Snibbe & Markus, 2005), child-rearing practices (Kohn & 
Schooler, 1969), health (Gallo, Monteros, & Shivpuri, 2009), and subjective well-being 
(Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003). And yet only recently have psychologists begun to 
explore whether and how social class influences the ways in which people perceive and 
construe their world (Argyle, 1994). 
 Many social scientists hold that people of higher social class status dictate and 
exemplify the cultural practices of a society as a whole (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; 
Gramsci & Rosengarten, 1994). Thus, one would also suspect that the cognitive 
tendencies of people of higher social class status would be more culturally typical.
1
 This 
interactive hypothesis of cultural trans- mission implies that the relationship between 
social class and cognitive tendencies will differ in societies that vary in their overall 
endorsement of those tendencies. An alternative additive hypothesis suggests that social-
class-related environments promote differences in practices and values (Kohn & 
Schooler, 1983), which in turn may foster different cognitive tendencies. According to 
this hypothesis, social class will have the same effect on cognitive tendencies regardless 
of cultural differences in the overall endorsement of those tendencies. In the studies 
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reported here, we examined whether social class is differentially associated with holistic 
versus analytic cognition in independently oriented and interdependently oriented 
cultures. In addition, we explored a common psychological mechanism underlying 
sociocultural differences in cognition. 
Cultural Hegemony Versus Self-Direction 
Philosophers, political scientists, and sociologists have suggested that people with higher 
social class status dictate the normative way of being and thinking in a given culture. For 
instance, the influential theory of cultural hegemony proposed by Gramsci suggests that 
the ideas and practices of the middle-class are seen by the working-class as general 
cultural norms, thus maintaining the existing social order (Gramsci & Rosengarten, 
1994). A similar argument has been made by Bourdieu in La Reproduction (Bourdieu, 
1984; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977), where he suggests that cultural institutions such as 
education are used by the upper classes as a means of affirming and transmitting their 
practices, beliefs, and cognitive tendencies as those of the dominant culture. Ethno- 
graphic reports also suggest that some working-class children engage in countercultural 
behaviors to oppose the behaviors and norms associated with the middle-class (Willis, 
1981), despite the high value of conformity among working-class adults (Kohn, 1969). 
These observations suggest an interactive hypothesis regarding social class and cognition: 
The cognitive tendencies of higher class people exemplify those of a society more so than 
the cognitive tendencies of lower class people. 
 An alternative additive hypothesis can be derived from the Marxist idea that 
control over the means of production and associated environmental affordances (e.g., 
working conditions) promote social class differences in cognitive style. Among others, 
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Kohn, Schooler, and colleagues (e.g., Kohn & Schooler, 1983; Schooler, Samuel, & 
Oates, 2004) proposed that differences in people‘s occupations are the cause of social 
class differences in beliefs and practices (e.g., child-rearing practices) associated with 
self-direction. In a series of studies, those researchers found that higher class jobs 
facilitate occupational self-direction and promote a self-directed orientation (Kohn & 
Schooler, 1983). More importantly, researchers have replicated the effect of social class 
on values observed in the United States in a series of surveys in Japan, Ukraine, Poland, 
and Russia (Kohn et al., 1997; Kohn, Naoi, Schoenbach, Schooler, & Slomczynski, 1990; 
Tudge, Hogan, Snezhkova, Kulakova, & Etz, 2000), suggesting that the effects of social 
class on cognitive tendencies may also be universal across different societies. 
Cultures and Analytic Versus Holistic Cognition 
 A revival in cultural psychological research has occurred in the past two decades 
(Heine, 2008). During this period, a heavy emphasis has been placed on two constructs: 
cognitive style and views of the self. Some countries, such as the United States, are 
characterized by analytic cognition: detaching a focal object from the perceptual field, 
predicting linear development of events, and ascribing causality to focal actors or objects. 
In contrast, other countries including China, Japan, and Korea are holistic, emphasizing 
paying attention to the entire perceptual field, especially relations among objects and 
events, predicting nonlinear development of events, and attributing causality to context 
(Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). The ecological validity of these differences 
has been supported by cross-cultural analyses of cultural products such as newspapers, 
art, and advertisements (Masuda, Gonzalez, Kwan, & Nisbett, 2008). 
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 Similarly, countries also differ in terms of their emphasis on self-direction as well 
as in their tendencies to endorse different views of the self. Some countries value 
independence: emphasizing uniqueness, possessing relatively low sensitivity to social 
cues, and encouraging self-directed behaviors that affirm autonomy. Other countries 
value interdependence, emphasizing harmonious relations with others, promoting 
sensitivity to social cues, and encouraging behaviors that affirm relatedness to others 
(Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2007). These cultural differences in views of the self have 
also been linked to differences in cognitive styles. A large body of evidence shows that 
interdependently oriented societies such as Japan, China, or Russia are more holistic in 
terms of cognitive style, whereas independently oriented societies such as Germany and 
the United States are more analytic (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett et al., 2001; also 
see Varnum, Grossmann, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2010, for a review). 
 It is worth noting that a self-directed orientation is part of the conceptualization of 
independent versus interdependent notions of the self (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
Consistent with research on social class effects on self-direction, psychologists have 
found that among North Americans higher social class status is associated with a 
preference for resisting influence and expressing uniqueness (Stephens, Markus, & 
Townsend, 2007) and lower levels of social mimicry (Kraus & Keltner, 2009)—all 
indications that higher social class is positively linked to independence. These findings, 
combined with the observation that self-views are associated with cognitive style 
(Varnum et al., 2010), suggest that working- class people are likely to be more holistic 
than middle-class people. In support of this claim, Kraus and colleagues found that 
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working-class Americans favor contextual explanations for social events (Kraus, Piff, & 
Keltner, 2009). 
 Building on previous research on social class and culture, in the present research 
we tested interactive versus additive accounts of the relationship between social class and 
cognitive style. According to the interactive hypothesis, one would expect the middle-
class to be more analytic than the working-class in predominantly analytic cultural 
contexts and more holistic than the working-class in cultural contexts where holistic 
thinking is more predominant. Alternatively, the additive hypothesis suggests that the 
middle-class is more analytic than the working-class above and beyond the effect of 
country because of social structural differences in environmental affordances linked to 
independent versus interdependent views of the self. 
Overview of the Present Research 
 We examined analytic or holistic cognition with a sample in which both country 
and social class varied simultaneously. We selected the United States as it is a Western, 
independently oriented society where analytic thinking is predominant (Nisbett et al., 
2001). We selected Russia as it is an interdependently oriented society where holistic 
thinking is predominant (Grossmann & Kross, 2010; Kühnen et al., 2001).
2
 Also, both 
Russian and American societies have been the focus of previous research on the 
relationship between social class and self-direction (e.g., Tudge et al., 2000). In Study 1, 
we examined class and country effects on dispositional bias. In Study 2, we addressed 
whether social class effects exist in other cognitive domains (visual attention and linear 
vs. nonlinear reasoning about change). In addition, we wanted to examine differences in 
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self-views as a mechanism that mediates country and social class effects on cognition 
(Study 2). 
Study 1 
 Study 1 sought to provide an initial test of the interactive and additive hypotheses, 
examining the effects of social class on cognition in the domain of social inference. This 
study was both a conceptual replication of previous work on social class and dispositional 
attribution (Kraus et al., 2009) and an extension of this work as it simultaneously 
examined cross-country differences in the same domain. Based on previous findings that 
Russians are more holistic than Westerners (Grossmann & Kross, 2010; Kuhnen et al., 
2001), we hypothesized that Russians would make less dispositional attributions for 
others‘ behavior. The interactive hypothesis predicted that country would moderate social 
class effects on attribution, whereas the additive hypothesis predicted that social class 
effects would be independent of the effect of country such that lower social class would 
be associated with less dispositional bias. 
Methods 
Participants. In exchange for course credit, 62 American students from the University of 
Michigan (34 females; Mage 1⁄4 18.71 years, SDage 1⁄4 0.86; all European Americans) 
and 60 Moscow State Regional University students (43 females; Mage 1⁄4 19.02, SDage 
1⁄4 1.35; 95% Russian, 5% other ethnicities) participated in the study. Moscow State 
Regional University is one of the top 20 Russian universities with students coming from 
the larger Moscow region. 
Procedure and materials. Participants completed the study on their own, guided by 
written instructions that informed them that the purpose of the study was to explore 
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‗‗personality differences in personal perception.‘‘3 Participants read two vignettes, which 
described a protagonist who performed either a desirable or an undesirable action 
(Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 2006, Study 3; see Appendix A for 
an example). After reading each vignette, participants answered two questions indicating 
(a) the extent to which ‗‗features of the protagonist such as his/her character, attitude, or 
temperament influenced his/her behavior‘‘ (dispositional attribution score) and (b) the 
extent to which ‗‗features of the environment that surround the protagonist such as the 
atmosphere, social norms, or other con- textual factors influenced his/her behavior‘‘ 
(situational attribution score; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Social class. Educational attainment has been proposed as the key factor that 
distinguishes different classes (e.g., Ehrenreich, 1989; Lareau, 2003; Willis, 1981).4 
Therefore, at the end of the study, participants indicated their parents‘ educational 
attainment (1 = high school, 2 = some college, 3 = completed college, 4 = postgraduate). 
The higher score in the family was used as an indicator of social class (Russia: M = 2.13, 
SD = 0.89; United States: M = 2.48, SD = 0.65). 
Results 
 Preliminary analyses indicated that the groups in each country were matched on 
age, t(120) = 1.51, ns, and gender (χ
2
 = 3.32, ns). Neither age nor gender interacted with 
social class,  age F(1, 120) = 1.09, ns; gender F(1, 120) = 0.01, ns, and controlling for 
these variables did not influence any of the results. Thus, they are not discussed further. 
 We performed a general linear model on the attribution scores (dispositional vs. 
situational) with country (Russia = –0.5 vs. the United States = 0.5) and social class as 
between-subject factors and story type (negative vs. positive) as a within-subject factor. 
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There were no main effects of country or story type (Fs < 1; see Table 2.1 for descriptives 
and zero-order correlations). We observed a significant country (Russia vs. the United 
States) X attribution score (dispositional vs. situational) interaction, F(1, 119) = 7.24, p < 
.01, with Russians showing less dispositional bias than Americans. Subsequent analyses 
conducted separately for dispositional and situational scores indicated that the interaction 
was driven by a significant effect of country on dispositional scores, F(1, 119) = 12.64, p 
= .001, with Russians making less dispositional attributions than Americans. The effect of 
country on situational attribution scores was not significant (F < 1). 
 In the next step, we examined the effects of social class. The social class � 
attribution score (dispositional vs. situational) interaction was significant, F(1, 119) = 
3.79, p = .05, (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2), with lower social class being associated with 
lower dispositional and higher situational scores than higher social class above and 
beyond the effect of country. Neither the country social class interaction nor any other 
interaction was significant (all Fs < 1). 
Study 2 
 Study 1 provided initial support for the additive hypothesis. In Study 2, we 
examined whether and how social class affects other aspects of holistic thinking. We 
sought to address this question by examining holistic versus analytic tendencies in visual 
attention and reasoning about change. 
 Another question we addressed in Study 2 concerns the psychological 
mechanisms that mediate cultural and social class differences in cognitive style. 
Specifically, in line with previous cultural psychological theories about the social origin 
of cognitive styles (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Varnum et al., 2010), we 
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hypothesized that independent versus interdependent self-views drive differences in 
analytic versus holistic cognition. Members of societies in which independent self-views 
are more common should be motivated to symbolically inflate representations of their 
personal self at the expense of others. Indeed, self- inflation is more common in more 
independent countries (e.g., the United States) than in more interdependent countries 
(e.g., Japan; Duffy, Uchida, & Kitayama, 2008; Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & 
Uskul, 2009). The second goal of Study 2 was to provide a formal test of this mediation 
hypothesis by simultaneously assessing cultural and social class differences in 
independent versus interdependent self-views and how these self-views relate to 
differences in cognition. 
Method 
Participants. In return for $12 (Michigan) or 350 rubles (Moscow, approximately $11), 53 
University of Michigan students (36 female; Mage = 19.54, SD = 1.33; 92.0% European 
Americans, 2.0% African Americans, 6.0% other ethnicities) and 61 Moscow City 
University of Education and Psychology students (46 female; Mage = 20.05, SD = 2.94; 
93.2% Russians, 6.8% other ethnicities) participated in the study. 
Procedure. Participants completed the study on their own, guided by written instructions, 
which informed them that this study explored social relationships and cognition and 
invited them to participate in the attention task. 
Dependent Variables 
Visual attention. Following Masuda and Nisbett (2006), participants watched three pairs 
of 20-s animated scenes (e.g., a construction site and an airport, each of them presented 
four times) on a technically identical 15 in. monitor, which included three to four focal 
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objects (moving or fixed in the foreground or middle-range area; e.g., aircraft) and 
several background objects (e.g., ground, sky, buildings). Each scene pair consisted of 
two similar but slightly different vignettes, and the participants‘ job was to detect the 
differences between them. Participants recorded changes between the first and second 
version. Two hypothesis-blind Russian–English bilinguals coded each sentence for 
reference to one of the two categories of change (focal vs. context). Inter-rater reliability 
was high (93% agreement, with disagreements decided by the first author). The number 
of changes to focal objects and to the context that participants noticed was counted and 
averaged across the four sets of scenes. Following Masuda and Nisbett (2006), focal 
change scores were subtracted from context change scores (r [difference scores] = .29) 
and collapsed to form a single index. 
Prediction of change. Participants were presented with eight graphs, each showing a trend 
(e.g., economic growth; for materials, see Ji, Nisbett, & Su, 2001), and indicated the next 
two points on each graph. We measured the vertical distance (number of cells on the grid) 
between the baseline in ‗‗2004‘‘ and the prediction in ‗‗2008.‘‘ These scores were 
multiplied by ‗‗–1‘‘ and averaged to form a single index of nonlinear reasoning (r > .42). 
Symbolic representation of self and friends (self-inflation). Self- inflation has been 
previously conceptualized as a ‗‗habitual, automatic, and thus implicit‘‘ tendency 
associated with independent and interdependent views of the self (Kitayama et al., 2009, 
p. 242). In our study, participants drew diagrams of their social networks (for verbatim 
instructions, see Duffy et al., 2008) using ovals to represent people. Two hypothesis-blind 
coders measured the diameter of each oval at its largest point (r = .95; coders‘ scores 
were averaged). A self-representation ratio was obtained by dividing the size of the 
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average friend- circle by the size of the self-circle. Previous research indicates that people 
in independent countries (e.g., the United States) count more people as part of their social 
network than people in interdependent countries (e.g., Japan; Fiori, Antonucci, & 
Akiyama, 2008). Because the space in which to draw the diagram is limited, including 
more friends may by necessity reduce the size of the ‗‗friend-circles.‘‘ To control for this 
potential artifact, we adjusted the self-inflation scores for the number of friends in the 
network. Another potential artifact is that individuals may differ in the size of the circles 
they draw in general. To control for this, we opted to calculate self-inflation as a ratio 
rather than a difference score. We took this adjusted score as an indicator of how 
interdependent a participant‘s self-views were, with higher scores indicating greater 
importance placed on close others relative to the self. 
Social class. Social class was measured using the procedure from Study 1 (Russia: M = 
2.89, SD = 0.55; United States: M = 3.36, SD = 0.90). 
Results 
 Cultural groups were matched on age, t(112) = 1.52, ns, and gender (χ
2
 = 0.86, 
ns). Neither age nor gender interacted with social class, age F(1, 112) = 0.15, ns; gender 
F(1, 112) = 0.01, ns, and controlling for these variables did not influence any of the 
results. Thus, they are not discussed further. 
 For each of the three dependent variables, we ran a regression with country 
(Russia = –0.5 vs. the United States = 0.5) and social class as predictors (see Table 2 for 
descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations). Country had a significant effect on each 
of the cognitive variables in the predicted direction (attention: β = .49, p < .001; 
prediction of change: β =.47, p < .001). As shown in Table 2.2, Russians paid more 
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attention to context and made more nonlinear predictions about change. Consistent with 
previous cross-cultural research on independent versus interdependent views of the self in 
Russia (e.g., Realo & Allik, 1999), Russians also showed less self-inflation than 
Americans, as indicated by the ratio of the size of friend-circles to the self-circle on their 
social network diagrams (β =.48, p < .001). 
 We next examined the effects of social class on these variables. Consistent with 
the results of Study 1, lower social class was positively associated with contextual 
attention and non- linear change prediction indicating more holistic cognitive tendencies 
(β =.20, p = .03 and β = –.17, p = .06, respectively). In addition, lower social class was 
positively associated with larger friend-to-self ratios (β = .32, p < .001), suggesting a 
more interdependent self-view. The country X class interaction did not have a significant 
effect on any of the dependent variables (all βs < .10, ns). 
 We subsequently examined whether self-inflation mediates the relationship 
between social class and each of the cognitive variables assessed in this study by 
performing a series of multiple regression analyses. As Figure 2.3 illustrates, in each case 
the conditions for establishing mediation according to Shrout and Bolger (2002) were 
met. Specifically, social class was related to self-inflation, and each of these variables 
was related to each of the outcome variables assessed in this study. Importantly, the 
results of a bootstrapping test, the technique of choice for assessing mediation in small 
samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002), indicated that control- ling 
for self-inflation significantly attenuated the relationship between social class and 
attention as well as the relationship between social class and prediction of change. 
Moreover, a mediation analysis with country (Russia vs. the United States) as a predictor 
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also indicated that controlling for self-inflation significantly attenuated the relationship 
between country and each of the cognitive variables (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4 for 95% 
confidence intervals generated by the bootstrapping test for each mediation analysis). 
Sobel tests confirmed the bootstrapping test results, indicating that social class effects 
were mediated by self-inflation (attention: Sobel = 1.71, p = .08; nonlinear reasoning: 
Sobel = 3.33, p < .001) as were country effects (attention: Sobel = 3.65, p < .001; 
nonlinear reasoning: Sobel = 2.96, p = .003). 
 Using structural equation modeling, we compared how well the model in which 
self-inflation mediates the social class–cognition (attention and nonlinear reasoning) link 
(Model 1) fit the data against a model in which cognitive tendencies mediate the social 
class–self-inflation link (Model 2). The results indicated that Model 1 fit the data well 
(comparative fit index [CFI] � 1, root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] ≤� 
.001, χ
2
 ≤ .83, p ≤ .36), whereas Model 2 fit the data poorly (CFI ≤ .98, RMSEA ≤ .09, χ2 
≤ 8.91, p ≤ .003). 
General Discussion 
 In two studies, we found evidence that social class and country have independent 
effects on cognition. We found that people from lower social class backgrounds were 
more holistic than those from higher social class backgrounds, and we found that 
Russians were more holistic than Americans with regard to contextual versus 
dispositional attribution, holistic processing of visual information, and prediction of 
nonlinear versus linear development of events. We also found that people from lower 
social class backgrounds and Russians endorse more interdependent self-views than do 
people from higher social class backgrounds and Americans. Furthermore, these 
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differences in self-views partially mediated the group differences in cognition that we 
observed. 
 Our research extends previous findings on the influence social class has on how 
people construe the world in three ways. First, the present results show that the effects of 
social class are not limited to social inference but can also be observed in nonsocial 
domains such as visual perception and prediction of change. Second, the effects of social 
class have been replicated in a non-Western interdependent society. These findings 
suggest that the interactive view of social class and culture needs to be seriously 
reconsidered. It appears that, at least with regard to cognitive style, people from higher 
social class backgrounds do not dictate and exemplify the cognitive tendencies of society 
as a whole. Instead, and consistent with previous theories that social class differences in 
environmental affordances lead to differences in self- direction (e.g., Schooler, 2007), the 
present research supports an additive account of social class and cultural differences in 
cognition. 
 Finally, we were able to identify a common mechanism that accounted for both 
social class and cross-national differences in cognition. These insights about the 
relationship among sociocultural environments, self-views, and cognition have both 
practical and theoretical implications. For instance, recent studies suggest that taking a 
broader, more holistic perspective can be adaptive when reflecting on negative events 
(Grossmann & Kross, 2010). Taken together with our current findings, this suggests that 
social classes may also differ in their patterns of emotion regulation. Future research 
should explore the relation- ship between class differences in cognitive style and emotion 
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regulation as well as its impact on health- and mood-related vulnerabilities (Adler et al., 
1994). 
 Several caveats are in order. The meditation analyses reported in this article are 
based on cross-sectional, correlational data, thus limiting causal inference. Longitudinal 
and experimental research is thus needed to more closely examine the causal nature of the 
relationships suggested by the mediation analyses reported in Study 2. In addition, it is 
worth noting that we used self-inflation as a measure of independent versus 
interdependent self-views in our research. At this point, it is an empirical question 
whether other measures of independence–interdependence also mediate the effect of 
culture and social class on cognitive tendencies. Previous work on social class suggests 
that it shapes many aspects of our social lives and experiences. The present research adds 
to this literature by showing that even basic nonsocial perception is colored by social 
class and that these class-related differences in cognitive style are linked to viewing the 
self as interdependent. Understanding that social class affects how people perceive and 
reason about the social and nonsocial world may have implications for fields such as 
marketing and politics as well as educational and therapeutic settings involving people of 
differing socioeconomic status. For example, people from lower social class backgrounds 
may be at a disadvantage in academic settings that reward analytical reasoning and 
perception. School curricula might be modified or interventions could be designed to 
address this disparity. Therapists may also benefit from the knowledge that working-class 
clients may be more likely to locate causality in the situation rather than the individual 







1. In line with theory in cultural psychology and cognitive development (e.g., Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Saxe, 1999), we use 
Vygotsky‘s (1978) theoretical framework proposing tight links between cultural practices 
and cognition. 
2. Previous cross-cultural behavioral and survey research has consistently documented 
that Russians are more interdependent than people in the Western societies. For instance, 
Naumov (1996) showed that Russians have higher scores on Hofstede‘s value dimensions 
related to interdependence than Germans. Similarly, Matsumoto, Takeuchi, Andayani, 
Kouznetsova, and Krupp (1998) conducted a multicountry comparison of individualistic 
versus collectivistic beliefs and behavioral tendencies, which indicated that Russians had 
significantly higher collectivism scores than Americans. Finally, Realo and Allik (1999) 
used the Twenty Statement Test to examine the relational versus independent self-
descriptions among Russian, Estonian, and American college students. Their results 
indicated a significantly larger percentage of relational self-descriptions among Russians 
than among Estonians, or Americans. 
3. All materials in this article were back translated from English into Russian (Brislin, 
1970) and presented in Russian to the Russian samples. 
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4. Consistent with sociological theory, education has been found to explain twice as much 
variance in occupational prestige as income and to be more closely related to other 
socioeconomic indicators (Oakes & Rossi, 2003). Therefore, and in line with theory and 
empirical work on social stratification (Ehrenreich, 1989; Gilbert, 2008), we sought to 
capture class differences on a continuum: working-class (high school)–lower middle-
class (some college)– upper middle-class (completed college)–intelligentsia class (post- 
graduates). Preliminary analyses yielded comparable results in both studies whether 



















Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations in Study 1  
 





1. 2. 3. 4. 
Undesirable action       
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Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations in Study 2. 




US (n=50)   1.   2.     3. 
1. Visual Attention  
 
.28 (.68) -.31 (.71) -.24*  .18
†
  .29** 
2. Prediction of 
change 
 
.43 (.84) -.51 (.96)  -.17
†
  .48*** 
3. Self-views .49 (.75) -.45 (.96)   -.35*** 
Notes. Zero-order correlations appear above the diagonal. Partial Correlations with 
social class appear on the diagonal. Higher numbers on all variables indicate 





p ≤ .05. 
**
p ≤ .01. 
***





















Figure 2.1. Effects of social class (+1 SD of the mean) for dispositional and situational 
















































































Figure 2.3. Standardized betas from a path analysis examining the role that self-inflation 
plays in mediating the effect of social class on (a) attention to context versus focal 
















 Note: Higher scores on the self-inflation measure indicate greater importance 
placed on close others relative to the self. The standardized coefficients in 
parentheses show the relationship between social class and the dependent 
variables after controlling for social orientation. In square brackets are 95% 
confidence intervals from a bootstrap test; the mediation is significant if the 
confidence interval does not include zero. 
 





Figure 2.4. Standardized betas from a path analysis examining the role that self-inflation 
plays in mediating the effect of culture on (a) attention to context versus focal 












 Note: Higher scores on the self-inflation measure indicate greater importance 
placed on close others relative to the self. The standardized coefficients in 
parentheses show the relationship between culture and the dependent variables 
after controlling for social orientation. In square brackets are 95% confidence 
intervals from a bootstrap test; the mediation is significant if the confidence 
interval does not include zero. 
 







              In  the  following  questionnaire  we  would  like  to  find  out  more  about  the  
effects  of  social perceptions of different people. You will be presented with 
several situations. Each of them will describe  a  person  involved  in  a  certain  
activity.  You  will  be  asked  to  think  about  different reasons for this person‘s 
behavior, as well as to evaluate this person‘s behavior. 
 







             Emma  Peterson  is  a  banker  at  a  large  bank  in  Cincinnati,  IN.  The  current  
financial difficulties   of   the   bank   may   have   a   negative   effect   on   the   
share-income   of   the   bank’s shareholders. 
              In the last couple of months, the bank lost a large amount of money on the stock 
market. However,  Emma  Peterson  did  not  reveal  the  loss  to  the  company’s  
shareholders  in  order  to avoid causing panic. Instead, Emma Peterson reported 
a sizeable profit at the annual meeting of 
             the  shareholders,  hoping  that  the  annual  balance  of  the  company  would  still  
be  positive  in comparison to the last year. 
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Please, carefully  read  the  following  statements  and  indicate  your  level  of  agreement  
with each of them. 
1.   Emma Peterson‘s personality primarily influenced her behavior. 
 
Strongly     Somewhat   Somewhat               Strongly   
Disagree  Disagree  Disagree   Neither  Agree      Agree  Agree 




2.  Particular circumstances primarily influenced Emma Peterson‘s behavior. 
 
Strongly     Somewhat   Somewhat               Strongly   
Disagree  Disagree  Disagree   Neither  Agree      Agree  Agree 
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Social Class Differences in N400 indicate differences in Spontaneous Trait 
Inference 
 
 Since at least the time of Marx (1845/1970) social scientists have hypothesized 
that social class has cognitive consequences. Yet only recently have psychologists begun 
to systematically explore the effect of social class on cognitive habits.  An emerging 
literature suggests that people from working-class backgrounds tend to have more holistic 
cognitive habits than those from middle-class backgrounds. For example, compared to 
middle-class Americans, working-class Americans tend to have more contextual patterns 
of visual attention (Na, et al., 2010; Grossmann & Varnum, 2011), and tend to reason 
more dialectically about the development of trends (Grossmann & Varnum, 2011).  
 People from working-class backgrounds also seem to be less prone to 
fundamental attribution error (FAE) than those from middle-class backgrounds.  FAE has 
been defined as a tendency to give undue weight to internal factors (such as personality 
traits, desires, and intentions) and to under-weight situational pressures and constraints 
when explaining the behavior of others (Ross, 1977). Krauss and colleagues (2009) have 
found that working-class people are more likely to believe that situational factors play a 
causal role in societal patterns, individual outcomes, and emotions.  Similarly, 
Grossmann and Varnum (2011) have found that people from working-class backgrounds 
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show less dispositional bias than do people from middle-class backgrounds when asked 
to explain the behaviors of others.  
 These class-based differences in causal inference have been interpreted as 
reflecting differential awareness of the structural and situational constraints on individual 
action that come with different positions in the class structure (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 
2009). People from working-class backgrounds are likely to have a greater number of 
experiences where choices and actions are constrained due to financial pressure. 
Working-class parents also tend to emphasize obedience wheras middle-class parents try 
to foster self-direction (Kohn, 1969; Kohn & Schooler, 1983). Such experiences might 
make situational constraints more salient for people from working-class backgrounds 
when reasoning about causality.  
 While it has been established that social class differences in causal inference exist, 
when and how such differences emerge is still an open question. Gilbert and Malone‘s 
(1995) 2-stage model of person perception holds that people automatically infer traits 
from behavior, but that they may engage in a second, more deliberate stage of processing 
where they weigh the impact of situational factors.  Thus, the final outcome in attribution 
is always a joint product of an initial trait inference and a later situational adjustment.. It 
is not obvious though at which  stage social class differences emerge.  
 On the one hand, it may be that class-based differences in causal inference are due 
to a correction for automatic dispositional bias. In fact, working-class people are more 
interdependent than middle-class people (Grossmann & Varnum, 2011; Kraus, Côté,, & 
Keltner, 2010; Na et al., 2010) and thus may be more motivated to attempt to maintain 
social harmony by taking context into account when explaining others‘ behavior. Or it 
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may simply be that because working-class people pay more attention to context than for 
middle-class people (Grossmann & Varnum, 2011; Na et al., 2010;), the former may be 
able to recognize more situational constraints than the latter and thus more likely to adjust 
for situational influences when making causal inferences... In any case, according to this 
view, social class differences in causal inferences are largely driven by the second stage 
in Gilbert and Malone‘s (1995) model.  If this is the case, then one would not expect 
social class differences to emerge in initial trait inference, but rather that the differences 
are due to  differences in a later stage, more deliberate process.  
 However, on the other hand, it may be that social class differences in attribution 
reflect differences in the initial automatic processing of trait relevant information. 
Situational constraints on behavior are likely to be more chronically salient for working-
class people than they are for middle-class people due to life experiences and 
socialization. If this is the case, then one might expect that working-class people may 
engage in dispositional inferences much less than their middle-class counterparts and 
consequently, trait-inference may be at least less automatic among working-class people 
than among middle-class people. 
 The major question that the present study seeks to address is whether social 
classes differ in  spontaneous initial trait inference. A recently developed ERP paradigm 
allows us to address this issue.  In their original study, Na and Kitayama (in press) had 
participants remember parings of a face and a trait-implying behavior. Note that since 
they were just asked to remember the parings, any trait inferences made during this phase 
can be considered spontaneous and automatic. To measure whether participants had 
engaged  in spontaneous trait inference (STI) during the memorization phase, participants 
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were asked to complete a  subsequent lexical decision task.  In this task, the previously 
learned faces served as a fixation point and the target stimuli were either a trait word that 
was implied by information learned about the individual, in the first phase, the antonym 
of the implied trait, or letter strings. The logic behind this design was that if participants 
made spontaneous trait inferences, then they would feel inconsistency when a face was 
paired with the antonym of the previously implied trait. In other words, semantic 
inconsistency induced by the antonym served as an index of spontaneous trait inference. 
This type of semantic incongruence is known to be captured by a specific ERP 
component called as N400, a negative peak occurring approximately 400 ms post-
stimulus presentation (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). Using this paradigm, Na and Kitayama 
(in press) demonstrated that European-Americans spontaneously engage in automatic 
trait inference, but Asian-Americans do not.   
 In the present study, using the ERP paradigm developed by Na and Kitayama (in 
press), we sought to test whether social class differences in attribution within the US 
might also be due to differences in automatic person perception.  We predicted that 
Americans from middle-class backgrounds would engage in spontaneous trait inference 
and thus feel inconsistency when exposed to faces followed by a trait word that is 
incongruent with information previously learned about the behavior of those individuals, 
which would result in a distinctive N400 response to these antonyms. However, we 
predicted that this effect would be much weaker or even absent among those from 
working-class backgrounds.  Furthermore, we argue that differences in STI occur because 
people from working-class backgrounds are more aware than those from middle-class 
backgrounds of situational and contextual influences on behavior. If this is the case, there 
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should be corresponding social class differences in lay theory of social behavior, such 
that those from working-class backgrounds endorse situational models of causality and 
those from middle-class background endorse models that give greater weight to 
dispositional factors. To test this premise, we also measured participants‘ lay theories of 
causation, and we investigated the relationship between lay causal theories and 
spontaneous trait inference as indexed by N400. 
Methods 
Participants 
 Twenty undergraduates with middle-class backgrounds (12 females) and 22 
undergraduates with working-class backgrounds (12 females) at the University of 
Michigan participated in return for monetary compensation ($20)
1
.  
Parental education was used as the indicator of social class. Participants with at 
least one parent who received a bachelor‘s or more advanced degree were defined as 
middle-class; those who did not have a parent who had completed college were defined 
as working-class (as in Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007).  
Procedures 
 Participants were told that the study was an investigation of how people 
remember social information. Then, they were further instructed to read and remember all 
the information presented on a computer screen. The stimuli consisted of sixty pairings of   
faces and sentences describing behavior were then presented in a random order. The face 
was first presented for 2 s. The behavior was then presented along with the face, and 
stayed on the screen for 7 s. There were 30 faces (15 males & 15 females) and 60 
behaviors. Each face was paired with two different behaviors that implied the same trait 
(e.g. ―His neighbor trusts him to watch her three year old son‖ and ―If he had to, he 
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would stay up until 3 am to make sure the project got done‖ implying the target is 
reliable). 
 After the memorization phase of the study, participants were asked to complete a 
lexical decision task was framed as a filler task. In fact, the task was designed to assess 
the magnitude of face-trait associations. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, each trial consisted 
of a face prime presented for 1500 ms as a fixation, immediately followed by 
presentation of a target stimulus for 200 ms. Participants were given up to 5000 ms to 
make a lexical decision regarding the target. 1400 ms after the decision period, the next 
trial started. To examine brain reaction in response to semantic incongruity, traits implied 
by the stimulus behaviors and their antonyms served as word targets in the lexical 
decision task. For each of the 30 faces we prepared a trait word that was implied by the 
two behaviors paired with the face (congruous trials), the antonym of the implied trait 
(incongruous trials), and two pseudo-word stimuli (pseudo-word trials). This yielded 120 
(30 x 4) trials in total. To ensure that the same set of trait words would be used on both 
the congruous trials and the incongruous trials, one trait word was served as the implied 
trait for one face and as the incongruous trait (the antonym of an implied trait) for another 
face. Thus, the congruity/incongruity of trait words were not confounded with the 
specific traits that were used.  
After the computer task, participants were given a measure of lay theory of social 
behavior (Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 2002). The questionnaire contained three 
arguments reflecting dispositionism and situationism (see Appendix A).  Participants 
indicated how much they agreed with each of three arguments on a 9-point scale (1 = 
Strongly Disagree, to 9 = Strongly Agree). Upon completion of the questionnaire, 
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demographic information was collected and participants were fully debriefed and 
dismissed. 
Physiological Recording and Processing 
The EEG was recorded with 32 electrodes placed according to the extended 
International 10/20-System in a nylon cap, and referenced to the left mastoid. The 
electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded from additional channels at the outer canthi of 
both eyes and above and below the left eye. EEG and EOG signals were amplified with a 
band-pass of DC to 100Hz by BioSemi Active-Two system, and sampled with 512Hz. All 
data was then re-referenced to the averaged left and right mastoid, and re-sampled at 
256Hz. The EEG for each trial was corrected for vertical and horizontal EOG artifacts as 
in Gratton, Cole, and Donchin (1983). ERPs to word targets were averaged over an epoch 
of 1200 ms (starting 200 ms prior to the presentation of each target), using a 200-ms 
prestimulus baseline. Only segments with correct responses were averaged. The trials 
with deflection exceeding ± 100 µV were excluded from averaging. The data were 
digitally low-pass filtered at 12 Hz for Figure 3.2.  
Results 
ERP Data Analysis  
The time course of ERPs was examined at all scalp locations first. The clearest 
pattern was identified in the posterior central (Pz) scalp location as in the previous study 
using the same paradigm (Na and Kitayama, in press). This is also consistent with 
previous work showing that the visual N400 is most clearly observed in the centro-
posterior region of the brain (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000).  
The ERPs to the target words (either ―implied‖ or ―incongruous‖) were depicted 
in Figure 4.1. We hypothesized that middle-class participants would show a clear sign of 
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N400 in response to incongruous traits as opposed to implied traits; in contrast we 
predicted that this effect would be much weaker among working-class participants. As 
shown in Figure 4.2, the expected pattern was observed. For middle-class participants, 
the difference between implied traits and incongruous traits clearly emerged around 400 
ms after the onset of the target words such that N400 was much more distinctive for 
incongruous traits than for implied traits. However, working-class participants did not 
show a difference between implied traits and incongruous traits.   
Since the waveform can sometimes be misleading because of individual variation 
among participants (e.g., outliers), mean amplitudes for the relevant time internal (350-
450 ms) were computed for statistical comparison. Most importantly, a 2 (Class: middle-
class vs. working-class) x 2 (Congruency: implied vs. incongruous) ANOVA revealed a 
significant class x congruency interaction, F (1, 40) = 6.02, p < .05, p
2 
=.13. For middle-
class participants, mean amplitudes were smaller for incongruous traits than for implied 
traits, Ms = 8.75 vs. 6.54, t (19) = 3.99, p = .001. In contrast, for working-class 
participants there was no effect on congruence on ERP deflection, Ms = 8.39 vs. 8.29, t 
(21) = .15, p = ns.  
Taken together, the results clearly suggest that middle-class participants drew 
strong trait inferences during the memorization phase of the study. Therefore, they later 
displayed clear evidence of semantic inconsistency (i.e., N400) when previous studied 
faces were paired with incongruous traits. However, we failed to find any evidence of 
spontaneous trait inference among our working-class participants. Their ERPs to the 
target words did not systematically vary as a function of congruency.
2
   
Lay Theory of Social Behavior 
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 We suspected that social class differences in spontaneous trait inference might be 
related to the corresponding differences in lay theories of causality. To test this 
proposition, we examined whether the class-based difference that we observed in the 
N400 incongruity effect might be related to participants‘ lay causal theories.. 
 To test the prediction, we first conducted 2 (Class: middle-class vs. working-class) 
x 2 (theory: dispositionism vs. situationism) ANOVA. Consistent with our predictions, 
the class x causal theory interaction was significant, F (1, 40) = 7.06, p < .05, p
2 
=.15 
(see Figure 3.3). Middle-class participants endorsed dispositionism more than 
situationism Ms= 6.35 vs. 5.05, t (19) = 1.75, p = .097, whereas the opposite was the case 
for working-class participants, Ms= 4.59 vs. 5.91, t (21) = 2.03, p = .056. Seen from a 
different angle, middle-class participants showed greater endorsement of dispositionism 
than did working-class participants, (Ms = 6.35 vs. 4.59), t (40) = 2.76, p < .01. The 
opposite pattern was found for endorsement of situationism, (middle-class M = 5.05 & 
working-class M = 5.91), although the difference failed to reach statistical significance, t 
(40) = 1.32, p = .19. The results confirmed our hypothesis that middle-class more 
strongly believe that one‘s behavior is driven by his or her internal disposition such as 
personality than working-class participants.  
Next, we examined whether the lay theory of social behavior could predict 
spontaneous trait inference as measured with N400. First, we created an index of 
participants‘ lay theory by subtracting situationism from dispositionism, with higher 
scores indicating more dispositional patterns of attribution.  As predicted, Middle-class 
participants (M = 1.30) scored higher than working-class participants (M = -1.32), t (40) 
= 2.66, p = .01. Then, the index of the N400 incongruity effect was also calculated by 
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subtracting the mean amplitudes of incongruous traits from those of implied traits. Note 
that larger values in this index reflects more spontaneous trait inference. Consistent with 
our predictions, lay causal theory significantly predicted the N400 incongruity effect, β = 
0.32, p <.05 (see Figure 3.4). That is, those who more strongly believed in dispositionism 
showed greater STI. 
Discussion 
 As predicted, we found evidence that middle-class, but not working-class, 
Americans engage in STI. This finding suggests that the social class differences observed 
in self-report measures of causal inference, such as explanations for societal phenomena 
and individual outcomes (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009), and attributions for the actions of 
individuals (Grossmann & Varnum, 2011), may be due to differences in early, automatic 
inference processes (as opposed to a relatively late stage correction for initial 
dispositional biases).   
The social class effects we observed in trait-congruence related N400 were 
parallel to the cultural differences observed by Na and Kitayama (in press). Na and 
Kitayama (in press) show that spontaneous trait inference is relatively unique to people 
living in independent cultures (e.g., European Americans). The present work extends that 
finding, and suggests that STI may be further limited to those from middle-class 
backgrounds.  It should be noted that  our working-class sample might be somewhat 
atypical as they are enrolled at one of the top US Universities, however the fact parental 
social class had an effect in this setting suggests that the influence of social class on 
cognitive habits is in fact highly persistent.  Nonetheless, it may be worthwhile to 
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replicate the present study with a non-student sample. It may also be interesting to see if 
this effect can be replicated in a predominantly interdependent culture, such as Japan. 
 Although there is a growing literature documenting SES-related neurocognitive 
deficits (for a review, see Hackman & Farah, 2009), the present study is one of the first 
neuroscience studies to address social class differences in cognition (analytic vs. holistic) 
that reflect different habitual modes of thinking as opposed to deficits.  Further, while our 
results are consistent with previous literature on social class, the present study extends 
that literature by showing that  social class affects automatic neural responses. Given the 
current findings, we believe that future research using ERP and fMRI to explore the 
psychological consequences of social class is likely to be fruitful and will add to our 




















1. We did not find any significant gender effects. 
2. We also examined whether main effects or class x congruence interactions were 
present at two earlier time regions around 100 ms (50–150 ms) and 200 ms (150–250 
ms). Neither interaction was significant (Fs < 1). Nor was there a significant effect for 
class at 200 ms, F(1,40) = 1.59, p = ns. There was however a marginally significant main 
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Figure 3.2. Grand-averaged ERPs at Pz in the implied trait condition and the in 
incongruous trait (antonym) condition for middle-class and working-class participants. 






























































Appendix A. Lay Causal Belief Items 
 
Dispositionism 
How people behave is mostly determined by their personality. One‘s personality 
predisposes and guides an individual to behave in one way, not in another way, no matter 
what circumstances the person is in. In a sense, behavior is an unfolding of personality. 
One‘s behavior is remarkably stable across time and consistent across situations because 
it is guided by personality. Therefore, if we know the personality of one person, we can 
easily predict how the person will behave in the future and explain why that person 
behaved in the particular way in the past. 
 
Situationism 
How people behave is mostly determined by the situation in which they find themselves. 
Situational power is so strong that we can say it has more influence on behavior than 
one‘s personality. Often, people in a particular situation behave very similarly, despite 
large individual differences in personality. Therefore, in order to predict and explain one‘s 
behavior, we have to focus on the situation rather than personality. Personality plays a 
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What‘s in a Name? Popular Names are less Common on Frontiers 
 
According to the voluntary-settlement hypothesis (Kitayama, Conway, 
Pietromonaco, Park, & Plaut, 2010; Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 
2006), the conditions of frontier settlement attract independently oriented individuals 
(e.g., people high in openness to experience and low in agreeableness; Jokela, 2009). At 
the same time, frontier conditions breed independent orientations even among people 
who are initially more interdependent. This hypothesis is supported by the well-
documented association between residential mobility and independent orientation (Oishi, 
Lun, & Sherman, 2007). However, it also moves beyond that association by specifying 
other features of the frontier that are likely to encourage independence, such as low 
population density and an associated herding economy (Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 
2008), relative lack of social connections and institutions (Kitayama et al., 2010), 
decreased risk of pathogen infections (Fincher, Thorn- hill, Murray, & Schaller, 2008), 
and potentially high returns for risks taken (Kitayama et al., 2010). 
Contemporary data showing that endorsement of individualistic values is stronger 
in recently settled U.S. states (e.g., Montana and Utah) than on the East Coast of the 
United States provides support for this account (Park, Conway, Pietromonaco, Plaut, & 
Kitayama, 2009; Plaut, Markus, & Lachman, 2002). Parallel differences can be observed 
between the resi- dents of Hokkaido, which was settled by ethnic Japanese in the late 
19th century, and the main islands of Japan (Kitayama et al., 2006), and between the 
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United States and countries (e.g., England and Germany) that colonized it (Kitayama, 
Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009). Values and psychological orientations of 
independence might then be expected to guide overt social behaviors to form the frontier 
ethos that is characterized by a strong commitment to personal autonomy, initiative, and 
uniqueness. In an important study, Vandello and Cohen (1999) found that more recently 
settled U.S. regions scored higher than less recently settled U.S. regions on an index of 
the frequency of residents‘ behaviors that could be guided by individualistic values (e.g., 
living alone after age 65, self-employment, and divorce). Yet most of the behaviors tested 
by Vandello and Cohen can also be strongly influenced by factors that are conceptually 
distinct from independence or individualism per se. For example, the percentage of 
individuals who are self- employed will depend on the availability of employment 
opportunities in a given region. Likewise, the divorce-marriage ratio may change as a 
function of such factors as religiosity and spousal abuse. We sought to fill this knowledge 
gap by examining a deliberate behavioral choice of substantial consequence that is clearly 
linked to independent values: namely, giving uncommon names (as opposed to popular 
names) to new babies. 
The choice that parents make between popular names and relatively uncommon 
names for their children has face validity as an indicator of independent beliefs and 
values. Therefore, it was used recently by Twenge, Abebe, and Campbell (2010) in their 
study of cultural changes in independence in the United States
1
. They observed that 
independence, as assessed in terms of how parents name their children, has increased 
over the past several decades within the United States. Naming practices embody 
important cultural values (Liebersen & Bell, 1992) and are linked to a host of 
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psychological, social, and economic outcomes (Christenfeld & Larsen, 2008). 
Furthermore, choosing a name is viewed as a fairly important decision, one of great 
interest to parents (a recent Google search for ―baby names‖ returned 8 million results) 
and one that is often made after lengthy deliberation, sometimes even with the aid of paid 
professionals (Alter, 2007). 
Consistent with the voluntary-settlement hypothesis, our pre- diction was that 
popular names would be chosen on frontiers less often than in comparable regions that 
have little or no history of frontier settlement. In three studies, we tested this prediction in 
terms of both within-country and cross-national variation. We computed the percentages 
of four naming variables: babies given (a) the most popular boy‘s name, (b) the most 
popular girl‘s name, (c) 1 of the 10 most popular boys‘ names, and (d) 1 of the 10 most 
popular girls‘ names in their respective state (Study 1), province (Study 2), or country 
(Study 3) 
Study 1 
In this study, we compared regions of the United States that were more recently 
settled with regions that were less recently settled. Specifically, we predicted that a 
greater percentage of babies would be given popular names in New England than in the 
Pacific Northwest and Mountain West regions (see Table 3.1 for a listing of the states in 
these regions). Furthermore, we predicted that the year in which states were admitted to 
the United States (a proxy for length of settlement) would be negatively correlated with 




We gathered data on names from the Social Security Administration‘s (2010) 
database of popular baby names for each state in 2007. This database represents a 
complete sample of Americans born in 2007 who were issued Social Security cards (N = 
4,309,707). We also gathered data on the number of live births and the percentage of the 
Caucasian population per state in 2007 from the U.S. Census Bureau‘s (2008) Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, 2007. We then computed the percentages of the four 
naming variables for each of the states in the New England region (which were some of 
the earliest established in the United States) and for each of the frontier states in the 
Mountain West and Pacific Northwest regions (which were more recently settled). 
Results 
As predicted, a greater percentage of babies were given popular names in the New 
England states than in the frontier states (Table 4.1 presents data for individual states). 
This held true for all states in those regions on each of the four variables. A one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing the two regions (Region 1 = New England, 
Region 2 = Mountain West and Pacific Northwest) found that a greater percentage of 
babies were given the most popular boy‘s name, F(1, 12) = 65.85, p < .001, d = 4.47, or 
the most popular girl‘s name, F(1, 12) = 61.67, p < .001, d = 4.00, in New England than 
in the frontier states. We observed the same pattern of regional difference in the 
percentage of babies given1 of the 10 most popular boys‘ names, F(1, 12) = 70.78, p 
<.001, d = 4.39, or 1 of the 10 most popular girls‘ names, F(1,12) = 103.80, p < .001, d = 
5.34. We obtained comparable results after sorting the states into quintiles based on the 
percentage of babies given 1 of the 10 most common boys‘ or girls‘ names (see Figs. 4.1a 
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and 4.1b). The results did not change when we controlled for state-wise percentages of 
various ethnic minorities (see Supplementary Information in Appendix A). 
When we examined the correlation between the relative frequency of popular 
baby names and the year in which each of the 50 states was admitted to the United States, 
we found that the year in which statehood was achieved was negatively correlated with 
the percentage of infants receiving the most popular boy‘s name, r = −.52, p < .001, and 
the percentage of infants receiving the most popular girl‘s name, r = −.45, p <.001, as 
well as the percentage receiving 1 of the 10 most popular boys‘ names, r = −.60, p < .001, 
or 1 of the 10 most popular girls‘ names, r = −.44, p < .001 (see Figs. 4.2a and 4.2b). 
These relations remained unchanged when we controlled for median income and 
population density (see Table 4.2); controlling for state-wise percentages of various 
ethnic minorities, including Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians, also did not change these 
relations (see Supplementary Information in Appendix A). 
Study 2 
In Study 2, we sought to replicate the regional differences observed in Study 1 in 
another country with a history of voluntary settlement: Canada. We predicted that a 
greater percent- age of babies would be given popular names in provinces in the eastern 
regions of Canada (which were settled earlier) than in provinces in the western regions of 
Canada (which were settled more recently). 
Method 
We gathered data on baby names in 2007 for seven provinces, including three 
eastern provinces (Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Quebec) and four western provinces 
(Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan). Data on names and live births 
 
74 
were gathered from the responsible authorities in each province (see Appendix A for a 
complete list of sources; note that the Ontario data came from 2003). We computed the 
percentages of the four naming variables for each eastern province and for each western 
province. 
Results 
Consistent with our predictions, our results showed that popular names were 
relatively more common in eastern Canada than in western Canada (Table 4.3 provides 
data for individual provinces). A one-way ANOVA comparing the two regions (Region 1 = 
eastern Canadian provinces, Region 2 = western Canadian provinces) found that a greater 
percentage of babies were given the most popular boy‘s name in eastern Canada, F(1, 5) = 
26.78, p = .004, d =4.00. Although the pattern was the same for the most popular girl‘s 
name, the difference did not reach statistical significance, F(1, 5) = 3.51, p = .12, d = 1.3. 
We observed the same pattern of regional difference in the percentage of babies given 1 of 
the 10 most popular boys‘ names, F(1, 5) = 22.76, p = .005, d = 3.29, or 1 of the 10 most 
popular girls‘ names, F(1, 5) = 5.73, p = .06, d = 1.65. Controlling for the percentage of the 
population that indicated French or another language as its mother tongue did not affect 
the results, all Fs > 14, all ps < .02. Controlling for population density did not affect the 
regional differences in prevalence of the top boys‘ name, F(1, 4) = 18.90, p < .02, or of the 
top 10 boys‘ names, F(1,4) = 61.49, p = .001; however, it eliminated the effect of region 
on the top girl‘s name and the top 10 girls‘ names, Fs < .02, ps > .90 
Study 3 
Study 1 and Study 2 provided evidence that regional variation in choosing a 
popular or relatively uncommon name corresponds to the history of settlement within 
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both the United States and Canada. Would corresponding differences be observed when 
European countries are compared with countries founded by European immigrants? 
Study 3 addressed this question. We predicted that a smaller percentage of babies would 
be given popular names in countries with a history of voluntary settlement by Europeans 
than in the European countries where those settlers originated. We also sought to test 
whether the naming practices were correlated with Hofstede‘s Individualism scores 
(Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). In addition, we examined the strength of the 
relationship between voluntary settlement and naming practices when controlling for 
other dimensions of cross-cultural difference that have been linked to cross-national 
differences in independence. 
Method 
We gathered data on names and live births for 2007 for nine European countries 
(Austria, Denmark, England, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Scotland, Spain, and Sweden) 
and four frontier countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States; see 
Supplementary Information in Appendix A for a complete list of data sources). For 
Australia and Canada, we aggregated the available territory- and province- level data. 
We calculated the percentages of the four naming variables for each European country 
and for each frontier country. 
Results 
Consistent with our predictions, our results showed that popular names were 
relatively less common in the frontier countries than in the European countries (see Table 
4.4 for data by country). A one-way ANOVA comparing the two regions (Region 1 = 
European countries, Region 2 = frontier countries) found that a smaller percentage of 
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babies were given the most popular boy‘s name, F(1, 11) = 11.63, p =.006, d = 2.31, or 
the most popular girl‘s name, F(1, 11) = 6.59, p = .03, d = 1.80, in the frontier countries 
than in European countries. We found the same pattern for the percentage of babies given 
1 of the 10 most popular boys‘ names, F(1, 11) = 18.43, p = .001, d = 2.97, or 1 of the 
10 most popular girls‘ names, F(1, 11) = 18.97, p = .001, d = 3.05. 
We next examined the correlation between countries‘ scores on Hofstede‘s 
Individualism dimension and the percentage of newborns who received popular names 
in those countries. All four measures of the percentage of babies who received popular 
names were highly negatively correlated with country- level Individualism scores, rs < 
−.69, ps < .01; this suggests that naming practices are a valid index of independence 
(see Figs. 4.3a and 4.3b and Table 4.5). Individualism scores remained a strong 
predictor of naming practices even when we simultaneously controlled for gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, population density, and historical pathogen 
prevalence, βs < −0.69, ps < .005. 
In order to assess the effect of settlement history, we ran a series of regressions 
with voluntary settlement dummy-coded and entered both alone and simultaneously with 
three other predictors: population density per square kilometer, GDP per capita, and 
countries‘ scores on Murray and Schaller‘s (2010) nine-item index of historical pathogen 
prevalence. We added historical pathogen prevalence because countries with histories of 
greater disease prevalence also tend to be more collectivistic and less individualistic 
(Fincher et al., 2008; Murray & Schaller, 2010). The effect of voluntary settlement 
remained significant for all four naming variables when we simultaneously controlled for 
these three other variables (βs ≤ −0.68, ps ≤ .02). This result suggests that settlement 
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history has an effect on naming practices above and beyond the effects of several other 
variables that have been linked to cross-national variation in individualism (see Table 
4.6). 
General Discussion 
 In three studies, we found that regional variations in baby naming corresponded to 
differences in those regions‘ history of settlement. People are more likely to choose a 
relatively popular name in regions with a longer history of settlement, and people in 
regions that were more recently settled are more likely to choose a relatively uncommon 
name. This phenomenon is evident not only within the United States (Study 1), but also in 
Canada (Study 2), and was also found in a cross- national comparison involving European 
countries and countries founded by European settlers (Study 3). This regional variation in 
naming practices is robustly predicted by the corresponding variation in individualism 
when controlling for a number of demographic factors. 
 We should also note that across the three studies, boys were somewhat more likely 
to receive popular names than girls were. The gender effect, however, did not depend on 
whether or not a region was a frontier. We suspect that the gender effect might reflect 
parental expectations. In particular, our conjecture is that parents might wish their baby 
girls to be unique and independent relative to their baby boys. This may be in part because 
parents are well aware that their girls are likely to be subject to more stringent gender-
based societal rules than boys are as they grow (Cross & Madson, 1997). 
 Our work is the first that clearly shows the significant influence of frontier 
settlement, in multiple cases, on a common behavioral measure of independence that has 
obvious ecological and cultural validity. We believe that harsh, sparsely populated, and 
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socially mobile frontier conditions foster values of independence, and that, as a 
consequence, behaviors that are guided by these values are more common in frontier than 
in nonfrontier regions. Such behaviors are likely to be incorporated into the regional 
cultural ethos, and, as a consequence, they may be transmitted across generations even 
when the geographic frontiers have long since disappeared. The study of regional 
variation, then, may afford a significant opportunity for further explorations into cultural 




















1. A preliminary investigation also revealed that people with relatively popular names for 
their birth year appear less likely to endorse independent values. In a reanalysis of data 
collected as part of the Michigan Wisdom Project (Grossmann et al., 2010), we found that 
people given one of the top 10 names nationally in their birth year scored lower on an 
adapted version of Singelis‘ (1994) independence subscale, F(1,184) = 9.77, p = .002. The 
results held when adding ethnicity as a covariate, F(1,182) = 9.40, p = .022, and when 














Table 4.1. Percent of babies born in 2007 with popular names by State 
 





















     
     
New England     
     
  Connecticut  1.52   1.23  12.69  10.16 
  Maine  1.54   1.57  12.11    12.10 
  Massachusetts  1.44   1.36  12.61  10.47 
  N. Hampshire  1.75   1.51  13.24  11.90 
  Rhode Island  1.52   1.32  15.68  15.19 
  Vermont  1.54   1.63  10.62  12.04 
       
  Mean (SD)  1.56 (.10)   1.47 (.15)   12.42(.97)  11.40 (.85) 
     
Mountain 
West & Pacific 
Northwest 
    
     
   Colorado   .99   .92   8.77   8.59 
   Idaho 1.07 1.10   8.23   7.48 
   Montana 1.09 1.06   8.60   7.78 
   Nevada 1.22   .77 10.08   6.53 
   Oregon 1.03   .99   9.01   8.23 
   Utah 1.26   .92   9.24   7.70 
   Washington 1.13   .97   8.84   8.07 
   Wyoming   .94   .91   8.20   6.82 
     












Table 4.2. Effect of voluntary settlement and other factors on naming practices in 50 US 
States (standardized beta‘s) 
 








% with Top 10 
Boys‘ Name 
% with Top 10 
Girls‘ Name 
Model 1 






  -.60*** 
 
-.44*** 
     
Model 2     
   Date of Statehood  -.39*  -.37*   -.39** -.39* 
   Population density
1
    .28   .18    .41*      .11 
   Median income
2 
 -.20    -.32*   -.07 -.11 
     
† = p < .1, * = p < .05, ** = p< .01, *** = p < .005 
Note: The table reports standardized regression coefficients. Data for population density 
per square mile for 2007 were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau‘s (2008) Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, 2007. Median-income data were obtained from the U.S. 















Table 4.3. Percent of babies born in Canada with popular names in 2007 by Province 
(where data is available) 
 
Province % given most 
popular boys’ 
name 
% given most 
popular girls’ 
name 
% given top 
10 boys’ 
name 
% given top 
10 girls’ 
name 





    
   Nova Scotia 1.86 1.91 12.95 13.66 
   Ontario
1 
1.82 2.01 14.46 11.32 
   Quebec 2.05 1.10 17.53   8.83 
 













    
   Alberta 1.54 1.01   9.48   8.20 
   British      
     Columbia 
1.34 1.08   9.98   8.75 
   Manitoba 1.55 1.11   9.48   7.90 
   Saskatchewan 1.36 1.47   8.99   8.79 
 






  9.48 (.40) 
 
  8.41 (.43) 
1










Table 4.4. Percent of babies born in with popular names in 2007 by country 
 
Country % given most 
popular boys’ 
name 
% given most 
popular girls’ 
name 
% given top 
10 boys’ 
name 
% given top 
10 girls’ 
name 




    
   Austria
 
2.97 2.51  20.31 19.41 
   Denmark
 
2.58 2.33 23.14 20.31 
   England&Wales 2.20 1.44 16.83 14.66 
   Hungary 3.49 2.90 26.67 20.21 
   Ireland 3.01 1.87 19.88 14.92 
   Norway 1.60 1.70 14.39 13.81 
   Scotland 2.38 2.12 15.81 14.41 
   Spain 3.21 3.90 23.73 23.79 
   Sweden 2.17 1.72 17.75 15.32 
   












    
   Australia
1 
1.71 1.37 12.87 10.80 
   Canada
1, 2 
1.75 1.46   9.50   9.74 
   New Zealand
 
1.56 1.31 10.74   8.89 
   US 1.11   .89   9.41   7.78 
 
   Mean (SD) 
 






  9.30 (1.28) 
1
Data aggregated from available Province/Territory level data, 
2

















% with Most 
Popular Boys‘ 
Name 
% with Most 
Popular Girls‘ 
Name 
% with Top 10 
Boys‘ Name 































Table 4.6. Study 3: Effect of voluntary settlement and other factors on naming practices 
(standardized beta‘s) 
 








% with Top 10 
Boys‘ Name 
% with Top 10 
Girls‘ Name 
Model 1 






  -.79*** 
 
-.80*** 
     
Model 2     
   Voluntary settlement  -.77**  -.68*   -.89*** -.85*** 
   Population density
1
    .08  -.12   -.16 -.10 
   GDP per capita
2 
 -.52*    -.49*   -.48*** -.38* 
   Pathogen prevalence
3
     .26   .37    .24†  .29† 
     
† = p < .1, * = p < .05, ** = p< .01, *** = p < .005 
Note: The table reports standardized regression coefficients. Data for population density 
per square kilometer were taken from the European Commission (n.d.) Eurostat  and the 
United Nations Demographic Yearbook (United Nations Statistics Division, 2007). Data 
for gross domestic product (GDP) per capita were taken from the data for 2007 in Human 
Development Indices: A Statistical Update 2009 (United Nations Statistics Division, 
2009). Data for pathogen prevalence were taken from Murray and Schaller‘s (2010) 



















Figure  4.1 Relative frequency of popular names in the United States (Study 1). States 
were grouped by quintile according to the percentage of babies given any of the 10 most 







Figure 4.2. Correlation between the date on which U.S. statehood was granted and the 
percentage of babies given any of the 10 most popular names in their respective state 






Figure 4.3.  Correlation between Hofstede Individualism score (Hofstede, Hofstede, & 
Minkov, 2010) and the percentage of babies given any of the 10 most popular names in 
their respective country (Study 3). Scatter plots (with best-fitting regression lines) show 






Appendix A. Supplemental Material 
Supplementary Analyses 
In Study 1, one potential confound is that Hispanic parents may be less likely to 
give their children one of the most popular names in their State. In order to control for 
this possibility we used data from the US Census Statistical Abstract to calculate the 
percent of Hispanic births in each state in 2007.  Overall the Frontier States appear to 
have had a greater percentage of Hispanic births than the New England States, however 
this difference was not statistically significant, F(1,12) = 2.61, p = ns. Importantly, 
however, controlling for the percent of Hispanic births did not affect the results (in terms 
of regional differences in naming), all F‘s > 50, p‘s < .001. It is also of note that the 
results remained unaffected by controlling for the percent of African-American births, all 
F‘s > 50, p‘s < .001, or the percent of Asian-American and Pacific Islander births, all F‘s 
> 50, p‘s < .001. 
In a separate analysis we found that year of Statehood remained a significant 
predictor of naming practices when controlling for percentage of Caucasians per State, 
β‘s  <  -.42, p‘s < .001, suggesting that these findings cannot be accounted for by 
differences in ethnic composition.   
Study 2 data sources 
 Data for Nova Scotia came from the Vital Statistics Division of Service Nova 
Scotia and Municipal Relations (http://www.gov.ns.ca/snsmr/pdf/ans-vstat-2007-annual-
report.pdf), data for Ontario came from Data Services, Service Ontario (report provided 




ms_01.aspx), data for Alberta came from the Government of Alberta, Service Alberta 
(http://www.servicealberta.ca/1163.cfm), data for British Columbia came from the British 
Columbia Ministry of Health‘s Vital Statistics Agency, 
(http://www.vs.gov.bc.ca/babynames/index.html), data for Manitoba came from the 
Manitoba Vital Statistics Agency 
(http://vitalstats.gov.mb.ca/pdf/2008_VS_Annual_Report_en.pdf), and data for 
Saskatchewan came from the Saskatchewan Information Services Corporation 
(http://www.isc.ca/VitalStats/Births/Baby%20Names/Pages/from2007.aspx).  
Data on population density by province was calculated using data on land area, 
population per province, and projected population growth from Statistics Canada 
(http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/l01/cst01/phys01-eng.htm?sdi=area), 
(http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/91-002-x/2008004/t002-eng.htm), 
(http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/91-002-x/2008004/t009-eng.htm), and Wikipedia, 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Canadian_provinces_and_territories_by_population
). 
Study 3 data sources 
Data for Austria came from Statistics Austria 
(http://www.statistik.at/web_de/static/vornamen_der_neugeborenen_mit_oesterreichische
r_staatsbuergerschaft_nach_f_021130.pdf), data from Denmark came from Statistics 
Denmark (http://www.dst.dk/Statistik/Navne/NamesPop.aspx?period=20072),, data for 




for Hungary came from the Hungarian Statistical Office 
(http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/tabl6_01_04ie.html#) and 
www.babynamestats.com (http://www.babynamestats.com/hungarian-top100-2007.html), 
data for Ireland came from the Central Statistics Office of Ireland 
(http://www.cso.ie/statistics/top_babies_names.htm), data for Norway came from 
Statistics Norway (http://www.ssb.no/navn_en/), data for Scotland came from the 
General Register Office for Scotland (http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/files1/stats/the-
most-popular-names-in-scotland-2007/j922202.htm), data for Spain came from the 
Institute Nacional de 
Estadistica(http://www.ine.es/en/daco/daco42/nombyapel/nombyapel_en.htm), and 
Sweden came from Statistics Sweden 
(http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart____225615.aspx, 
http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart____225613.aspx). Data for Australia came 
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/3301.02007) and the 
responsible authorities for each province for which data was available. Data for New 
South Wales came from the New South Wales Government Registry of  Births, Deaths, 
& Marriages (http://www.bdm.nsw.gov.au/cgi-bin/popularNames.cgi, 
http://www.bdm.nsw.gov.au/birthsStatistics.htm), data for Queensland came from the 
Queensland Registry of Births, Deaths, & Marriages 
(http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/justice-services/births-deaths-and-
marriages/births/popular-baby-names), data for Southern Australia came from the 
Government of Southern Australia‘s Office of Consumer and Business Affairs 
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(http://www.ocba.sa.gov.au/bdm/babynames.html), data for Victoria came from the 
Victorian Registry of Births, Deaths, & Marriages 
(https://online.justice.vic.gov.au/bdm/popular-names), and data for Western Australia and 
the Northern Territory came from www.babynamestats.com 
(http://www.babynamestats.com/popular_names_australia_2007.html, 
http://www.babynamestats.com/popular_names_australia_2007.html).  Data for Canada 
came from the relevant Provincial governments (see Study 2). Data for New Zealand 




2009.aspx), the US data came from the Social Security Administration and the Census 
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 In this chapter I will summarize the major findings of Chapters 2-4 and discuss 
their theoretical implications. I will also explore some practical implications of these 
findings for fields such as education, marketing, and persuasive campaigns designed to 
influence behavior. I will also discuss future research directions based on the present 
findings. 
 
Summary of Major Findings 
 Chapter 2 explored the effects of social class as well as larger cultural context on 
analytic vs. holistic cognitive habits and on views of the self. In these studies we 
examined whether social class has a similar effect to culture on these variables, and 
whether this effect varied as a function of the predominance of independence or 
interdependence in the culture at large.  For all 4 variables (attribution, visual attention, 
change prediction, and symbolic self-inflation) social class had a similar effect to culture. 
People from working-class backgrounds placed more weight on contextual factors when 
reasoning about the causes of others‘ behavior, showed more contextual patterns of visual 
attention, predicted that events were more likely to develop in a dialectical fashion, and 
demonstrated less inflated views of the self compared to people from middle-class 
backgrounds. These effects were parallel to and independent of the effect of culture. 
Consistent with the idea that differences in views of the self drive differences in cognitive 
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habits, both the social class differences and the cultural differences in cognition observed 
in Study 2 were mediated by symbolic views of the self. 
 Using ERP‘s, Chapter 3 sought to test whether social class differences in causal 
inference were the result of differences in automatic person perception or from deliberate, 
late stage correction for dispositional bias as might be suggested by Gilbert and Malone‘s 
(1995) 2-stage model. Here too social class differences in cognition appear to arise from 
similar sources as cultural differences.  Similar to the finding that Asian-Americans do 
not appear to engage in spontaneous trait inference (Na & Kitayama, in press), people 
from working-class backgrounds also did not show evidence of this automatic 
dispositonal bias. This study suggests that social class differences in causal inference, like 
cultural differences, have fairly deep neural roots.  
 Chapter 4 examined the effect of voluntary settlement on the choice of relatively 
popular vs. relatively unique names for children. Study 1 found that regions of the US  
which were more recently settled (such as the Pacific Northwest and the Mounatin West) 
have a lower prevalence of children receiving names popular in their respective state than 
do regions of the US with a longer history of settlement (such as New England). Further, 
we observed a strong negative correlation between the prevalence of popular names and 
the date at which a state was admitted to the Union, which held controlling for a number 
of demographic variables. In Study 2 the same pattern was observed when comparing 
western and eastern Canadian provinces. Study compared the prevalence of popular 
names in countries that were relatively recently settled by Europeans (the US, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand) and in European countries (including the England, Scotland, 
Ireland, Spain, and Sweden). The difference between these two groups of countries 
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remained significant controlling for other factors (such as GDP, population density, and 
historical pathogen prevalence) which have previously been invoked to explain cross-
national differences in independence-interdependence. In addition, national prevalence of 
popular names was strongly negatively correlated with country-level scores on 
Hofstede‘s (2010) individualism dimension (a relationship which held controlling for a 
variety of demographic variables). These findings suggest that the settling of frontiers 
may in part explain both contemporary patterns of cross-cultural differences in 
independence and regional differences within countries. 
Implications for Cultural Psychology 
 These findings have a number of implications for cultural psychology, the most 
obvious being that within-culture factors (such as social class and region) can have 
effects that are parallel to those of broader cultural context and that the mechanisms 
which lead to cross-cultural differences may also lead to within-culture differences. 
Social class differences in cognitive habits, like cultural differences, are mediated by 
differences in views of the self (Chapter 2). Class-based differences in causal inference, 
like cultural differences, appear to stem from automatic neural processes rather than 
deliberate, late-stage correction for initial automatic dispositional inference (Chapter 3). 
And regional variations within countries in behavior reflecting a preference for 
uniqueness, like variation between countries, are linked to settlement history (Chapter 4). 
However, it is worth noting that mechanisms underlying between and within culture 
differences are not always the same. For example, while both class and cultural 
differences in attribution arise from differences in automatic as opposed to controlled 
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processes, class differences were not mediated by self-construal (as was the case in Na 
and Kitayama, in press). 
 Another fairly basic implication of these within-culture studies is that when 
conducting cross-cultural research, it is important for investigators to take into account 
the distribution of social class within their samples and the history of the specific 
subcultural region from which their samples are drawn. It may be both safest and most 
informative to collect data from people in multiple regions and of differing social class 
when conducting cross-cultural studies. It may also be especially important to do so when 
conducting research in societies where little cultural psychology has taken place. On a 
related note, the growing body of literature on within-culture variation should lead 
cultural psychologists to be cautious in generalizing their findings to larger cultural 
groups based on fairly homogenous student samples. 
 This work also has deeper implications for the psychological study of culture. It is 
worth noting that the operationalization of social class in Chapters 2 and 3 was based on 
parental education. The fact that differences were observed among students at the same 
universities suggests that the effects of early socialization and the cross-generational 
transmission of values are highly persistent, even when one is immersed in a context 
shaped by different values.  This occurs even though the group difference in question is 
not one that is obviously marked by skin color or language. This may imply that the 
differences which have been frequently observed in the cultural psychology literature 
between Asian-American and European-Americans are due more to the transmission of 
cultural values and ways of thinking than to stereotypes and self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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 The findings in Chapter 4 provide support for the idea that distal historical factors 
(i.e. Cohen et al., 1996; Nisbett, 2003) may indeed have contemporary psychological 
consequences. The origins of American individualism may be due to a host of factors 
related to the settling of frontiers, including self-selection and environments which 
rewarded self-reliance and independence. The persistence of these differences in the 
present day suggests that a contemporary cultural ethos may continue to transmit and 
reinforce regional and national variations in values and views of the self, long after the 
environmental factors which gave rise to such differences have ceased to be relevant. 
Practical Implications 
 Regional and social class variations in social orientation and cognitive style have 
a number of real world implications for areas ranging from education to persuasion. For 
example, Western educational settings tend to promote analytic thinking (Ventura et al., 
2008). This may place those from working-class backgrounds at a disadvantage as their 
habitual ways of thinking emphasize holism and context. Given this difference, it may be 
advisable to explicitly emphasize and teach analytic ways of viewing the world to 
working-class children, or to adjust academic curricula to reflect both holistic and 
analytic modes of thought.  
 The fact that working-class people and those from regions that were less recently 
frontiers have a more interdependent social orientation also might inform advertising 
targeted at these groups. Indeed there is some evidence that working-class people show 
less preference for products that express uniqueness and greater preference for those 
which are perceived as popular (Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007). Further, it seems 
likely that working-class people would prefer products that reflect interdependent values. 
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To some extent marketers appear to be aware of these differences; ads aimed at working-
class audiences tend to differ from those aimed at middle-class audience in terms of how 
products are framed (connecting to others vs. distinguishing the self from others; 
Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007). Given the findings in Chapter 4, it may also be 
useful for advertisers to take into account regional variations in preference for uniqueness 
in order to most effectively sell their products. 
 Public service campaigns may also be informed by regional and social class 
variations in independence-interdependence. A recent paper by Hamedani and colleagues 
(in press) finds that European-Americans prefer products that are framed in as reflecting 
independence and are more motivated to action in general by messages framed 
independently (as opposed to interdependently). It may also be that these types of frames 
are more effective for middle-class people and those living in the western US than 
working-class people or those from Eastern states. Similarly, appeals based on 
descriptive norms (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990) may be more persuasive to 
working-class people and those from Eastern states.  
 Regional differences in social orientation also have somewhat counterintuitive 
implications for political campaigns. Ads emphasizing a candidates self-reliance may be 
more effective in more recently settled areas of the US (perhaps including the so-called 
―Heartland‖ which was more recently a frontier), whereas ads emphasizing a candidates 
close ties to family and involvement in the community might be more effective in areas 




 As cultural psychologists become increasingly interested in factors like social 
class and region, it will be important to continue to combine between and within culture 
approaches. It will also be important, when these factors appear to have the same type of 
effects, to explore the mechanisms that underlie both cultural and within-culture 
differences.  
 Although the present set of studies contribute to our understanding of the 
importance of within-culture factors in cultural psychology (and their relation to cross-
cultural differences), a number of important questions remain to be answered. This 
research also suggests a number of promising lines of future inquiry. I will begin by 
discussing questions and potential future research that build most directly on the studies 
that comprise this dissertation, and I will conclude by discussing other questions which 
may be informed by the present work. 
 One alternative interpretation of the present data is worth noting. It may be that 
differences in relational mobility (for a review see, Schug, Yuki, Horikawa, & Takemura, 
2009) underlie social class and regional differences. It may be for example that working-
class people are more interdependent because they have less relational mobility and thus 
are obligated to forge closer relationships. It may also be that those who settle frontiers 
do so because they feel less closely bound by relationships and are thus more willing to 
go to frontiers. Frontiers also might continue to attract people who are less closely bound 
in relationships. Future research may seek to measure relational mobility as it may be an 
important mediator of with-culture effects. 
 In terms of social class, as noted before in this Chapter, parental education is 
linked to differences in social orientation and cognitive habits among university students. 
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Given that previous work has found analogous differences as a function of people‘s own 
level of education among an adult sample of non-students (Na et al., 2010) it may be 
interesting to assess when a person‘s own social class status as opposed to their 
background becomes more important in determining their levels of independence-
interdependence and analytic vs. holistic cognitive habits. It may also be informative to 
assess the relative contribution of parental vs. own educational attainment among a non-
student sample. 
 With regard to regional variation stemming from voluntary settlement, one 
question which remains to be answered regarding the role of settlement history on 
contemporary values and practices has to do with the issue of self-selection and 
potentially social and sexual selection. As research in behavioral genetics has progressed, 
genotypes that affect the production and reception of dopamine have been linked to 
personality traits, such as risk taking (Kreek, Nielsen, Butleman, & LaForge, 2005), 
impulsivity (Kreek et al., 2005) and novelty seeking (Schinka, Letsch, & Crawford, 
2002) which seem likely to be selected for in frontier environments. It will be interesting 
to see if the dopamineurgic genotypes associated with these traits differ in their 
distribution as function of voluntary settlement. 
 Another question related to voluntary settlement has to do with which aspects of 
social orientation and cognition are affected. When comparing Hokkaido (a recent 
frontier) with the rest of Japan, Kitayama and colleagues (2006) found differences in 
implicit views of the self and patterns of emotional experience. However, a similar study 
comparing frontier vs. non-frontier regions of the US did not find differences in implicit 
measures of the self or cognition, but did find difference in explicit values (Park et al., 
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2009). A more systematic study of regional variation in both implicit and explicit 
measures related to the self may help to clarify these findings. It may be that the ethos of 
the frontier has a greater impact on explicit values and behaviors that are expressive of 
them, but does not affect more implicit aspects of the self. More generally, it seems likely 
that while broader cultural milieu has a wide range of psychological consequences, 
subcultural variations may be more limited and domain specific. 
 It should be noted that none of the studies presented in this dissertation 
manipulated the salience of within-culture identities.  Future studies in which social class 
and regional identity are primed would help to confirm that these factors have a causal 
role in creating and maintaining the differences observed in Chapters 2-4. As people have 
a number of identities which may or may not be salient at a given moment, such 
manipulations may be a useful way to elicit different social orientations and modes of 
cognition. 
 Some identities, such as social class status, can be manipulated not only in terms 
of the salience of one‘s identity, but also its content. For example participants‘ subjective 
sense of social class is likely subject to manipulation by changing the reference group 
with whom participants compare the self. Future researchers might also attempt to 
manipulate subjective social class status to see how this affects a host of variables related 
to social orientation and cognitive habits. 
 Priming research might also shed light on the contribution of ideas evoked by the 
frontier mythos in producing and perpetuating contemporary regional and cross-national 
differences in social orientation. For example, images or stories evoking the idea of 
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frontier settlement, might lead to more independence not only among those from frontier 
regions or countries. 
 It would also be worthwhile to explore the consequences of the fit between 
people‘s social orientation and cognitive habits with those of their sub-cultural group for 
outcomes like subjective well-being, self-esteem, and depression. Recent work by 
Dressler and colleagues (2007; 2008) on what they describe as ―cultural consonance‖ 
may be informative here. For example, Dressler (2007) finds that among a sample of 
Brazilians the fit between cultural norms regarding family life and one‘s actual family 
life predicted levels of depression. This may also hold true for consonance on other 
dimensions. For example, one might predict that those who are more culturally typical in 
terms of certain components of social orientation (such as values, self-views, and patterns 
of emotional experience) and/or cognitive habits (such as reasoning about others‘ 
behavior and about the unfolding of trends) might have higher levels of well-being. This 
might also be the case when looking at what one might term ―sub-cultural consonance.‖ 
Indeed, given the fact that people generally tend to make self-judgments based not on 
their evaluation of humanity at large or their society as a whole but on more proximal 
reference groups (Festinger, 1954; Hyman, 1942), it may be that sub-cultural consonance 
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